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PRIVATE RIGHTS VERSUS PUBLIC POWER:
THE ROLE OF STATE ACTION IN ALASKA
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
ScOTr J. NOPDSTRAND* AND PAUL D. SEYFERTH**
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to
innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in
pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his
inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spas-
modic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to
exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy,
disciplined by system, and subordinated to "the primordial neces-
sity of order in the social life." Wide enough in all conscience is the
field of discretion that remains.
Benjamin N. Cardozol
I. INTRODUCTION
At the threshold of constitutional litigation stands the barrier of
"state action." Traditionally, in order for a litigant to wield a consti-
tutional sword he must first demonstrate that his opponent carries the
authority of government; that is, that the State is acting in contraven-
tion of the litigant's constitutional rights. Absent proof of state action,
few of the laudatory limitations on government action may be imposed
upon the relationships between private parties.2
In recent years individuals have sought to impose constitutional
limitations upon the actions of other private individuals. In essence,
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1. B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1921) (quoting 2
F. GENY, METHODE D' INTERPRETATION ET SOUCRES EN DROIT PRIVE PosmF
§ 200, at 303 (1919), translated in 9 MODERN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES 45 (1921)).
2. Leudtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989). The one
notable federal exception to this generality is the thirteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution, which prohibits the institution of slavery, both by government
and individuals. See Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 216 (1905).
ALASKA LAW REVIEW
these litigants argue that the rights delineated in the federal and state
constitutions provide not only a shield against improper government
action, but also a sword for use in litigation against others.3
The purpose of this article is to examine these issues in the con-
text of retail shopping centers. Specifically, may private individuals or
organizations constitutionally limit the public's right of free speech
and assembly in their privately owned shopping centers? We conclude
that they can, for the following reasons.
The state action barrier to constitutional litigation is not an end
in itself. Compelling arguments have been made that the federal and
state constitutions were only intended to impose limitations upon the
government's relations with its citizenry, and not upon the relation-
ships between individual citizens.4 This conclusion, however, only
begs the question of why state action is a valuable component in
Alaska's constitutional framework. The importance of the state action
requirement can only be understood through a philosophical approach
to the question, firmly grounded in an understanding of the purpose of
the Alaska Constitution.
The documentary history of the Alaska Constitution reveals that
its framers understood civil rights and individual liberties described in
article I to be limitations on government, not individual citizens. By
drafting a constitution based upon this premise, the framers joined in a
firmly established tradition of constitutional understanding. The
framers of the Alaska Constitution thus did not intend to impose con-
stitutional norms on the relations between individual citizens.
Philosophically, the natural rights described in the Alaska Con-
stitution provide a second basis for the state action requirement. Gov-
ernmental sovereignty originally vested in the people of Alaska.5
Through the vehicle of their constitution, the Alaska citizenry granted
its government the authority to act on its collective behalf.6 But that
authority is limited by the terms of Alaska's constitution: individual
citizens retain their inherent "natural right to life, liberty, the pursuit
of happiness, and the enjoyment of the rewards of their own industry
3. This metaphor is taken from Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 423
Mich. 188, 212, 378 N.W.2d 337, 348 (1985) and Alderwood Assoc. v. Washington
Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 250, 635 P.2d 108, 119 (1981) (Dolliver, J.,
concurring).
4. See, eg., Johnson v. Tait, 774 P.2d 185, 190 (Alaska 1989); Leudtke, 768 P.2d
at 1130 (Alaska 1989).
5. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 2 ("All political power is inherent in the people. All
government originates with the people, is founded upon their will only, and is insti-
tuted solely for the good of the people as a whole.").
6. Id.
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... ."7 Here lies the initial philosophical significance of the state ac-
tion requirement.
Closely connected to the concept of individual liberty as a basis
for the state action requirement is the separation of powers doctrine.
Alaska's constitution sets forth a structure of government which
places lawmaking power in the hands of the legislature.8 Directly re-
sponsive elected officials are granted the power to regulate conduct
between private individuals. If, however, constitutional rights are
viewed as weapons for private litigants, it necessarily falls to the judici-
ary to regulate the relations between private individuals. The legisla-
ture is thus removed from the process. The longer the reach of the
constitutional sword in private disputes, the greater the usurpation of
legislative power by the judiciary.9
In support of these conclusions, the analysis below is divided into
three sections. The first section discusses the well-settled, but varied,
federal approach to the state action issue.10 The next section analyzes
the disparate conclusions reached by appellate courts in states that
have addressed the state action questions presented by modem shop-
ping centers." Then, the current state of Alaska law is examined,
evaluating the philosophical foundations of state action in Alaska. Fi-
nally, the conclusion proposes some answers to the questions that
modem shopping centers present.
II. STATE ACTION UNDER THE FEDERAL CoNsTITUTIoN
The United States Supreme Court has taken inconsistent posi-
tions regarding free expression rights in privately-owned shopping
centers. In a series of four cases, beginning in 1968 and concluding
some eight years later, the Court originally recognized the "public
function" doctrine in the shopping center context, but by 1976 had
rejected that position entirely.' 2 The intellectual source for these four
7. Id. art. I, § 1.
8. Id. art II, § 1.
9. See infra notes 157 through 167 and accompanying text.
10. The federal approach to state action provides the basis for nearly all state
constitutional jurisprudence, even where state courts have reached conflicting conclu-
sions. Therefore, the federal cases must be evaluated first in order to place the state
experiences in context. See infra Section IL
11. Because the Alaska courts have not yet addressed the issue of free speech
within privately-owned shopping centers, a survey of other jurisdictions will provide
additional context to the subsequent Alaska law discussion. See infra Section IIl.
12. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551
(1972); Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 (1972); Amalgamated Food
Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968). Un-
questionably, the changing composition of the Court had much to do with this meta-
morphosis. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 584 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
1990]
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shopping center cases is Marsh v. Alabama.13 A detailed analysis of
Marsh is essential to a complete understanding of the "public func-
tion" approach to state action, both at the federal and state levels.
A. Marsh v. Alabama: The Genesis of "Public Function"
Chickasaw was a suburb of Mobile, Alabama, but unlike most
traditional suburbs, this small town was wholly-owned and operated
by the Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation. It was a classic "company
town," developed by Gulf Shipbuilding to provide for the needs of its
employees. The property itself consisted of streets, residential build-
ings, a sewage disposal plant and a "business block" where businesses
were located. A deputy sheriff served as Chickasaw's policeman, at
company expense. Chickasaw's business district included a United
States Post Office from which carriers delivered mail to Chickasaw
and adjacent, non-company areas. The town of Chickasaw was in no
way distinct from the surrounding non-company property and to the
uninformed observer the town looked like any other town in Ala-
bama.14 The United States Supreme Court observed:
In short the town and its shopping district are accessible to and
freely used by the public in general and there is nothing to distin-
guish them from any other town and shopping center except the
fact that the title to the property belongs to a private corporation.15
A Jehovah's Witness came to the town of Chickasaw, stood on
the sidewalk near the post office and began to distribute religious liter-
ature. The corporation had a posted policy prohibiting this kind of
solicitation. After refusing to leave, the Jehovah's Witness was ar-
rested and charged with criminal trespass. Both the trial court and
the Alabama Court of Appeals rejected the defense of the Jehovah's
Witness that her distribution of religious literature was protected ac-
tivity under the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution. 16
The Supreme Court rejected the conclusions of the Alabama
courts that the private character of the property precluded the imposi-
tion of constitutional limitations upon private parties: "Ownership
dissenting) ("I am aware that the composition of this Court has radically changed in
four years.").
13. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
14. Id at 502-03.
15. Id
16. Id at 503-04. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The fourteenth amendment imposes the restrictions of the first amendment
upon the individual states. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
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does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner, for his
advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general, the
more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and consti-
tutional rights of those who use it."'' 7 Writing for the Court, Justice
Black concluded that Gulf Shipbuilding's property rights were "not
sufficient to justify the State's permitting a corporation to govern a
community of citizens so as to restrict their fundamental liberties and
the enforcement of such restraint by the application of a State
statute." 8
Marsh established that when a private party maintains a "com-
pany town," it also accepts the constitutional limitations imposed
upon municipal governments that provide those same services to the
public.19
B. Marsh's Progeny: The Shopping Center Cases
More than twenty years after the decision in Marsh v. Alabama,
the United States Supreme Court faced its first free expression case in
the context of a shopping center. Amalgamated Food Employees
Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza20 concerned union picketing of
a non-union supermarket in a shopping center known as the Logan
Valley Mall. At the time of the picketing, Logan Valley Mall was a
newly-developed shopping center with only two tenants: a supermar-
ket and a department store. The supermarket had posted a policy
outside its building that prohibited trespassing and solicitation by any-
one other than its employees in its parcel pickup area or parking lot.2'
17. Marsh, 326 U.S. at 506.
18. Id at 509.
19. The Marsh decision was reached by a five to three majority. Justice Jackson
did not participate. Id at 510.
Justice Reed lodged an articulate dissent. He pointed out the constitutional diffi-
culty that Marsh presented by permitting a person to "remain on private property
against the will of the owner and contrary to the law of the state so long as the only
objection to his presence is that he is exercising an asserted right to spread there his
religious views." Id at 512 (Reed, J., dissenting). The dissent notes:
Such distinctions are of degree and require new arbitrary lines, judicially
drawn, instead of those hitherto established by legislation and precedent....
... The restrictions imposed by the owners upon the occupants are
sometimes galling to the employees and may appear unreasonable to outsid-
ers. Unless they fall under the prohibition of some legal rule, however, they
are a matter for adjustment between owner and licensee, or by appropriate
legislation.
Id. at 512-13. Justice Reed concluded: "The rights of the owner, which the Constitu-
tion protects as well as the right of free speech, are not outweighed by the interests of
the trespasser, even though he trespasses in behalf of religion or free speech." Id. at
516.
20. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
21. Id. at 308-11.
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Soon after the supermarket opened, union members - not em-
ployees of the supermarket - began picketing in the pickup area and
parking lot of the supermarket. 22 At the behest of the supermarket
and shopping center management, a Pennsylvania court enjoined
union members from picketing on shopping center property.23 The
state court explicitly rejected the union's claim that the first amend-
ment entitled union members to picket within the confines of the shop-
ping center and its parking lots.24 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court injunction 25 and the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 26
In Logan Valley, the Supreme Court went to great lengths to
point out the similarities between the Logan Valley Mall and the
"company town" in Marsh.27 The Court concluded that "[t]he shop-
ping center here is clearly the functional equivalent of the business
district of Chickasaw involved in Marsh. '28 As such, the union pick-
eting activity was constitutionally protected.29
Justices Black, Harlan, and White penned individual dissents. As
the author of the majority opinion in Marsh, Justice Black's dissent in
Logan Valley is particularly poignant. Justice Black rejected the no-
tion that Logan Valley Mall was strikingly similar to the company
town of Chickasaw in Marsh, noting:
I think it is fair to say that the basis on which the Marsh decision
rested was that the property involved encompassed an area that for
all practical purposes had been turned into a town; the area had all
the attributes of a town and was exactly like any other town in Ala-
bama. I can find very little resemblance between the shopping
center involved in this case and Chickasaw, Alabama. There are no
22. Id. The picketers charged that the supermarket's employees were not receiv-
ing union wages and benefits. The union's picketing was peaceful, although some spo-
radic congestion occurred in the parcel pickup area. Id at 311-12.
23. Id. at 312. In effect, the order required that all picketing be carried on along-
side the public roads outside the shopping center and its parking lots.
24. Id at 313.
25. Logan, 391 U.S. at 313.
26. Id at 309.
27. Id at 317-19 (characterizing those similarities as "striking").
28. Id. at 318.
29. Id at 325. Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall opined that first amend-
ment access in this case was essential for two reasons. First, requiring union members
to picket adjacent to public roads - outside of the shopping center and its parking
lots - would render the picketers' messages "virtually indecipherable" to those at
whom the speech was directed, the supermarket's customers and employees. Second,
the union picketers would be "in some danger by being forced to walk along heavily
traveled roads along which traffic moves constantly at rates of speed varying from
moderate to high." Id. at 321-22. The court specifically limited its ruling to speech
"directly related in its purpose to the use to which the shopping center property was
being put." Id. at 320 n.9.
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homes, there is no sewage disposal plant, there is not even a post
office on this private property which the court now considers the
equivalent of a "town." Indeed, at the time this injunction was is-
sued, there were only two stores on the property.... All I can say is
that this sounds like a very strange "town" to me.30
Black also rejected the Court's suggestion that the grocery pickup
zone adjacent to the supermarket had somehow been dedicated to a
public purpose.3 1 He concluded:
[Pletitioners cannot, under the guise of exercising First Amendment
rights, trespass on respondent Weis' private property for the pur-
pose of picketing. It would be just as sensible for this Court to al-
low the pickets to stand on the checkout counters, thus interfering
with customers who wish to pay for their goods, as it is to approve
picketing in the pickup zone which interferes with customers' load-
ing of their cars.32
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court decided two compan-
ion cases which again addressed the state action question in the con-
text of shopping centers. The first case, Central Hardware Co. v.
NLRB,33 concerned union picketing of retail establishment - this
time, independent, freestanding hardware stores. In order to solicit
union membership from the employees of two hardware stores, the
union began picketing in the parking lots. As in previous cases, the
hardware stores had rules against solicitation in their stores and park-
ing lots. The stores' owners sought protection from the National La-
bor Relations Board, alleging that the picketing constituted an unfair
labor practice. The National Labor Relations Board struck down the
hardware stores' anti-solicitation rules and, citing Logan Valley, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concurred.34
Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice Powell distinguished the
circumstances in Central Hardware from those in Logan Valley:
Logan Valley involved a large commercial shopping center which
the Court found had displaced, in certain relevant respects, the
functions of the normal municipal "business block." First and
Fourteenth Amendment free-speech rights were deemed infringed
30. Id. at 331 (Black, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
31. Id. at 328 (Black, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 329 (Black, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). In his dissent, Justice
Harlan alluded to the "separation of powers" problem raised by the Court's decision
to impose first amendment limitations upon private property owners:
If it were shown that Congress has thought it necessary to permit picketing
on private property, either to further the national labor policy under the
Commerce Clause or to implement and enforce the First Amendment, we
would have quite a different case. But that is not the basis upon which the
Court proceeds, and I therefore dissent.
Id. at 340 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
33. 407 U.S. 539 (1972).
34. Id. at 540-42.
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under the facts of that case when the property owner invoked the
trespass laws of the State against the pickets.
Before an owner of private property can be subjected to the
commands of the First and Fourteenth Amendments the privately
owned property must assume to some significant degree the func-
tional attributes of public property devoted to public use. The First
and Fourteenth Amendments are limitations on state action, not on
action by the owner of private property used only for private
purposes.35
Justice Powell noted that the only municipal characteristic of the
hardware stores' facilities was that their parking lots and buildings
were "open to the public."' 36 The Court rejected that basis for finding
"public function" state action, as "[s]uch an argument could be made
with respect to almost every retail and service establishment in the
country, regardless of size or location."'37 Central Hardware estab-
lished that an independent, free-standing retail establishment with a
parking lot does not take on the characteristics of a "company town"
simply by vrtue of its commercial operations.
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner38 was decided by the Court on the same
day as Central Hardware. Unlike Central Hardware, however, Lloyd
concerned a shopping center with an interior mall area known as
Lloyd Center.39 Lloyd Center had a strictly enforced policy against
solicitation and distribution of handbills on its property. Protestors
began distributing handbills in Lloyd Center stating political opposi-
tion to the draft and the Vietnam War. Lloyd Center officials in-
formed the protestors that they would be arrested if they continued to
distribute the handbills. 40
The protestors brought an action against Lloyd Center in United
States district court seeking injunctive relief to permit distribution of
their handbills. The district court found Lloyd Center to be the func-
tional equivalent of a public business district, in the Logan Valley tra-
dition.41 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 42
35. Id. at 547.
36. Id
37. Id
38. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
39. Lloyd Center covered approximately 50 acres with 20 acres of open and cov-
ered parking facilities. It included approximately 60 commercial tenants, ranging
from small shops to major department stores. The stores were located in a multi-level
building with center sidewalk areas, stairways, escalators, gardens, an auditorium and
a skating rink. Id at 553.
40. Id at 555-56.
41. Id
42. Id. at 552.
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Once again, Justice Powell wrote the opinion for the Court, dis-
tinguishing Lloyd from Logan Valley. The Court reiterated that its
ruling in Logan Valley was limited to:
the picketing involved, where the picketing was "directly related in
its purpose to the use to which the shopping center property was
being put," and where the store was located in the center of a large
private enclave with the consequence that no other reasonable op-
portunities for the pickets to convey their message to their intended
audience were available.43
The Court noted that, unlike Logan Valley, the speech of the
protestors in Lloyd was unrelated to any "purpose for which the
center was built and being used"44 and the protestors had many alter-
native ways to exercise their first amendment rights.45 The Court
concluded:
Nor does property lose its private character merely because the
public is generally invited to use it for designated purposes. Few
would argue that a free-standing store, with abutting parking space
for customers, assumes significant public attributes merely because
the public is invited to shop there. Nor is size alone the controlling
factor. The essentially private character of a store and its privately
owned abutting property does not change by virtue of being large or
clustered with other stores in a modem shopping center.46
In Lloyd, the Court tenuously retained the Logan Valley analysis
while erecting a content-based test for determining whether privately-
owned shopping centers need respect the first amendment rights of
those on their property. First amendment speech related to the center
or one of its tenants, as in Logan Valley, was protected. However, first
amendment speech unrelated to either the shopping center or its ten-
ants, as in Lloyd, was not protected.
In Hudgens v. NLRB,47 the United States Supreme Court came
full circle on the Logan Valley case. Adopting Justice Black's dissent
in Logan Valley, the Court summarily rejected the notion that the
"public function" analysis of Marsh should apply to shopping
centers.48
In Hudgens, the Court once again faced the question of whether
labor union picketing against a shopping center tenant within the con-
fines of its interior mall was protected first amendment activity. This
shopping center was a large building with approximately sixty retail
43. Id. at 563 (quoting Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 320 n.9 (1968)).
44. Id. at 564 (footnote omitted).
45. Id. at 566-67.
46. Id. at 569.
47. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
48. Id. at 521. See Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 327-33 (Black, J., dissenting).
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stores, one of which was the Butler Shoe Company. Butler's ware-
house employees had gone on strike and were picketing the retail out-
lets of their employer.49
The general manager of the shopping center threatened to have
the union picketers arrested if they continued to picket the Butler
store in the shopping center. The union then filed an unfair labor
practice charge against the shopping center's owner, alleging that the
picketing was protected first amendment activity pursuant to Logan
Valley.50 The National Labor Relations Board agreed, as did the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals.51
Justice Stewart began the opinion of the Court by noting:
It is, of course, a commonplace that the constitutional guaran-
tee of free speech is a guarantee only against abridgement by gov-
ernment, federal or state. Thus, while statutory or common law
may in some situations extend protection or provide redress against
a private corporation or person who seeks to abridge the free ex-
pression of others, no such protection or redress is provided by the
Constitution itself.52
The Court then discussed the incongruities between the Logan Valley
and Lloyd decisions:
The Court in its Lloyd opinion did not say that it was overrul-
ing the Logan Valley decision. Indeed a substantial portion of the
Court's opinion in Lloyd was devoted to pointing out the differences
between the two cases, noting particularly that, in contrast to the
hand-billing in Lloyd, the picketing in Logan Valley had been spe-
cifically directed to a store in the shopping center and the pickets
had had no other reasonable opportunity to reach their intended
audience. But the fact is that the reasoning of the Court's opinion in
Lloyd cannot be squared with the reasoning of the Court's opinion in
Logan Valley.
It matters not that some Members of the Court may continue
to believe that the Logan Valley case was rightly decided. Our insti-
tutional duty is to follow until changed the law as it now is, not as
some Members of the Court wish it might be. And in the perform-
ance of that duty we make clear now, if it was not clear before, that
the rationale of Logan Valley did not survive the Court's decision in
the Lloyd case.53
49. Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 508-09.
50. Id. at 509-10. See U.S. CONST. amend. I, supra note 16.
51. Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 508.
52. Id. at 513 (citation omitted).
53. Id. at 517-18 (footnotes and citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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The Court recognized that its content-based distinction between Lo-
gan Valley and Lloyd was inappropriate.5 4 Therefore, with Logan Val-
ley now firmly overruled, the picketers of Butler Shoe Company were
not protected by the first amendment.55
Thus, under the United States Constitution, shopping centers are
no longer considered to perform a "public function" such that the
mandates of the first amendment may be imposed upon their private
owners. State constitutions, however, have provided an independent
basis for reaching the Logan Valley conclusion.5 6 The next section of
this article concerns those states that have addressed this issue.
III. STATE ACTION IN OTHER STATE JURISDICTIONS
Twelve states have specifically addressed the issue of whether pri-
vately-owned shopping centers render such a "public fumction" as to
give rise to constitutional protections.57 Of those twelve jurisdictions,
nine have rejected the notion that property rights of private shopping
center owners should give way to an alleged constitutional right of
expression. 58 Only three jurisdictions - California, Massachusetts,
and arguably, Oregon - have imposed the mantle of government
upon private shopping center owners.59
A. California: The Pruneyard Decisions
The genesis of the state constitutional approach to shopping
center free speech cases can be found in the California decision of Rob-
bins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center.60 The discussion of the relevant
law of other jurisdictions must begin there.
The Pruneyard Shopping Center was privately-owned and occu-
pied approximately twenty-one acres. It contained sixty-five shops,
ten restaurants and a cinema. Prneyard had a policy not to permit its
tenants or visitors to engage in expressive activity not directly related
to the commercial purposes of its tenants. 61
One Saturday afternoon a group of high school students set up a
card table in Pruneyard's central courtyard. The students opposed the
United Nation's resolution against Zionism and solicited support from
54. Id. at 520.
55. Id. at 521.
56. See infra notes 75 through 130 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 75 through 130 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 85 through 130 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 75 through 84 and accompanying text.
60. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74
(1980).
61. Id at 902, 592 P.2d at 342, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
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Pruneyard shoppers on a petition to that effect. The activity was ap-
parently peaceful and nondisruptive.62
Pursuant to Pruneyard's policy against solicitation, the center re-
quired the students to leave. They later brought suit against
Pruneyard, alleging violations of their free speech rights under the
California Constitution. The superior court denied the students' re-
quest for an injunction. The students then appealed to the Supreme
Court of California.63
The first question considered by the California court was whether
Lloyd recognized federal property rights of shopping center owners to
such a degree that the California court was barred from establishing
broader free speech rights under the California Constitution than de-
fined under its federal counterpart. Second, assuming that California
could establish broader constitutional rights, the question remained
whether the California Constitution protected the students' speech in
this case.64
Initially, the California court held that the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court did not prevent the California Constitution
from granting broader free speech rights than the federal constitu-
tion.65 The court then discussed the important role that shopping cen-
ters had come to play in modem society: "Shopping centers to which
the public is invited can provide an essential and invaluable forum for
exercising [free speech and petition] rights. ' ' 66 The court then con-
cluded: "sections 2 and 3 of article I of the California Constitution
protect speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping cen-
ters even when the centers are privately owned." 67
Pruneyard was subsequently appealed to the United States
Supreme Court to resolve the following question:
whether state constitutional provisions, which permit individuals to
exercise free speech and petition rights on the property of a pri-
vately owned shopping center to which the public is invited, violate
the shopping center owner's property rights under the Fifth and
62. Id.
63. Id. at 902-03, 592 P.2d at 341-42, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 854-55.
64. Id at 903, 592 P.2d at 342, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
65. Id. at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
66. Id.
67. Id. In his dissent, Justice Richardson argued that granting the high school
students constitutional rights of expression beyond the scope of federal law necessarily
conflicted with the federally protected property rights of the shopping center owners.
[Tihe owners of defendant Pruneyard Shopping Center possess federally pro-
tected property rights which do not depend upon the varying and shifting
interpretations of state constitutional law for their safeguard and survival.
Id. at 912, 592 P.2d at 348, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 861 (Richardson, J., dissenting) (empha-
sis in original).
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Fourteenth Amendments or his free speech rights under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. 68
The Court first noted that Lloyd would not necessarily preclude the
state of California from "adopt[ing] in its own Constitution individual
liberties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitu-
tion."'69 Next, the Court concluded that the fifth amendment guaran-
tee against the taking of property without just compensation and the
fourteenth amendment guarantee against deprivation of property
without due process of law were not impinged under these circum-
stances. 70 Specifically, the Court determined that Pruneyard's prop-
erty rights were not sufficiently impaired to rise to the level of a
"taking. ' 71 Furthermore, Pruneyard could not establish to the satis-
faction of the Court that its due process rights had been violated. 72
Finally, the Court considered whether Pruneyard's first amend-
ment rights were violated when the California court required shopping
center owners to use their property as a "forum for the speech of
others."' 73 The Court found that (1) the shopping center was not lim-
ited to the personal use of its owner, (2) the state had not dictated that
specific messages be displayed on the shopping center property, and
(3) the shopping center owner could disavow any connection with
public messages by simply posting signs of disclaimer. Therefore, it
concluded that the first amendment rights of the shopping center own-
ers had not been impaired by the California court.74
Pruneyard has challenged courts in other jurisdictions to view
their state constitutions expansively. As the discussion below demon-
strates, only a few jurisdictions have reached the California result,
while the majority have followed federal thinking on this issue.
B. Other States Finding Constitutional Rights in Private Shopping
Centers
1. Massachusetts. In Batchelder v. Allied Stores International,75
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts concluded that a citi-
zen's right to solicit signatures in support of a political candidate's
nomination outweighed the property interests of the private shopping
center owner. The Massachusetts court specifically reserved the issue
of whether free speech provisions of the Massachusetts Declaration of
68. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 76-77 (1980).
69. Id. at 81 (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 82-85.
71. Id. at 84.
72. Id. at 84-85.
73. Id. at 85 (footnote omitted).
74. Id. at 87-88.
75. 388 Mass. 83, 445 N.E.2d 590 (1983).
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Rights similarly applied to private shopping centers. 76 The court only
concluded that article IX of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights,
relating to free elections, did not require state action and therefore
applied to private individuals.77
2. Oregon. In Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, 78 the Oregon Supreme
Court reached the Pruneyard conclusion, but without the Pruneyard
analysis.79 Members of the public had solicited signatures on initiative
petitions within the confines of a shopping center. The shopping
center had posted a policy against solicitation and sought an injunc-
tion to preclude the petitioners' activity on its property. 80
Although the parties made the same constitutional arguments set
out in Pruneyard and elsewhere, the Oregon Supreme Court refused to
deal with the case on a constitutional level.8 1 The court instead bal-
anced the public policy in favor of the petitioners' access to the shop-
ping center for soliciting signatures against the property interests of
the shopping center owners.8 2
The court concluded that the petitioners could not "be enjoined
from entering the Center to express their opinion, so long as they do so
reasonably and without interfering with plaintiff's commercial enter-
prise. '8 3 While the Oregon court based its decision upon the common
law claims of trespass and nuisance, it used much of the same analysis
as cases based upon constitutional interpretations.8 4
C. States Rejecting Constitutional Rights in Private Shopping
Centers
States that have most recently addressed the issues discussed in
this article have rejected the Pruneyard analysis and its progeny in
76. Id. at 91-92, 445 N.E.2d at 595. See MASS. CONST. art. XVI (relating to free
speech).
77. Batchelder, 388 Mass. at 89-90, 445 N.E.2d at 593-94. See MASS. CONST. art.
IX (relating to free elections).
78. 307 Or. 674, 773 P.2d 1294 (1989).
79. Id. at 688, 773 P.2d at 1302.
80. Id. at 678-79, 773 P.2d at 1296.
81. Id. at 679-80, 689, 773 P.2d at 1296-97, 1302.
82. Id. at 684-85, 773 P.2d at 1299-1300.
83. Id. at 687, 773 P.2d at 1301.
84. Id. at 685, 773 P.2d at 1300 ("Shopping malls have become part of American
life. Large numbers of the public gather there. Although plaintiff tries to cloak a
public mall as a private place, it is the antithesis of a private place."). See also id. at
690, 773 P.2d at 1303 (Carson, J., dissenting) ("[A] plain reading of the majority
opinion makes it abundantly clear that the majority expressly decides several constitu-
tional issues while swearing allegiance to the rule against premature constitutional
adjudication.").
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favor of the limited federal approach. 85 The decisions of the nine juris-
dictions that now reject the notion of expressive rights in the context
of private shopping malls are described below.
1. Arizona. In Fiesta Mall Venture v. Mecham Recall Commit-
tee,86 the Arizona Court of Appeals reviewed a trial court injunction
that precluded individuals from soliciting signatures on recall petitions
within the confines of several large shopping malls.8 7 The petitioners
argued that their freedoms of speech and petition under the Arizona
Constitution were infringed by the malls' anti-solicitation policies and
the lower court's injunction. 88
The Arizona court rejected the suggestion that the large shopping
malls at issue were akin to the "company-town" in Marsh.89 It con-
cluded after reviewing similar cases from other jurisdictions "that the
more persuasive are those in which the courts have determined that
their states' constitutions do not require private property owners to
permit political activities on their premises." 90 The petitioners' free
speech and petition rights were not "intended to restrain private
conduct." 91
2. Connecticut. Cologne v. Westfarms Associates92 concerned the
free speech and petition rights of a women's political advocacy group
in a large regional shopping mall. 93 The Connecticut Supreme Court
rejected the Pruneyard approach, suggesting that to do otherwise
would infringe upon the legislature's power:
For the court to assume such a regulatory function, however, would
relegate the legislature to a subordinate role in our governmental
scheme .... We cannot presume that [the legislature] has any less
concern for political liberty than this court.
94
85. See infra notes 86 through 130 and accompanying text.
86. 159 Ariz. 371, 767 P.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1988).
87. Id. at 372, 767 P.2d at 720. Each of the malls had "a policy of prohibiting
activities other than shopping or those which promote shopping." Id.
88. Id. at 372-73, 767 P.2d at 720-21. See ARiz. CONST. art. II, § 6 (relating to
free speech); id. art. II, § 5 (relating to free assembly and petition).
89. Fiesta Mall, 159 Ariz. at 372, 767 P.2d at 724 ("The shopping malls in ques-
tion here are not the functional equivalent of towns. They are simply areas in which a
large number of retail businesses is grouped together for convenience and efficiency.").
90. Id. at 375, 767 P.2d at 723.
91. Id.
92. 192 Conn. 48, 469 A.2d 1201 (1984).
93. Id. at 50-56, 469 A.2d at 1202-05. The trial court had ordered the shopping
mall to permit the women's group to distribute literature and solicit signatures on
petitions. Id. at 52-53, 469 A.2d at 1203-04. See also CONN. CONST. art. I, §§ 4, 5, 14
(relating to free speech and petition rights).
94. Cologne, 192 Conn. at 65-66, 469 A.2d at 1210.
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The court concluded that it could not compel private parties to allow
the public exercise of free speech and petition rights on their
property.95
3. Georgia. In a brief decision, the Georgia Supreme Court re-
cently held that a person soliciting signatures in a privately-owned
shopping mall had no constitutional right to conduct such activities in
contravention of the mall's anti-solicitation policy.96 The court specif-
ically adopted the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in
Lloyd, rejecting the Pruneyard analysis of the California court.97
4. Michigan. In Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby,98 the
Michigan Supreme Court considered whether a consumer advocacy
group's solicitation of signatures in various shopping malls was pro-
tected activity under the Michigan Constitution.99 The court framed
the threshold issue as "whether the provisions of the Michigan Consti-
tution involved reach such private conduct and property at all." °
The court analyzed the question in terms of private autonomy
and separation of powers, which it asserted as the philosophical under-
pinnings of the state action requirement,10 and reviewed the law of
other jurisdictions. 0 2 The court rejected the Pruneyard approach and
found no state action in the Michigan shopping malls:
We are aware of the extensive development of large shopping
malls and the opportunities for individuals and groups to engage in
activities such as the gathering of signatures for initiative petitions
therein. But, we cannot in judicial conscience reinterpret our state
constitution in a way that is contradictory to its fundamental pur-
poses, its history, the intentions of its authors, the past decisions of
95. Id. The Connecticut court also rejected arguments that the Connecticut Con-
stitution should be read more broadly than its framers had intended:
This court has never viewed constitutional language as newly descended
from the firmament like fresh fallen snow upon which jurists may trace out
their individual notions of public policy uninhibited by the history which
attended the adoption of the particular phraseology at issue and the inten-
tions of its authors.
Id. at 62, 469 A.2d at 1208.
96. Citizens for Ethical Gov't, Inc. v. Gwinnett Place Assocs., 260 Ga. 245, _,
392 S.E.2d 8, 10 (1990).
97. Id. The Georgia Supreme Court also noted that the trend in other state juris-
dictions was away from the Pruneyard approach. Id. at _, 392 S.E.2d at 9-10.
98. 423 .ich. 188, 378 N.W.2d 337 (1985).
99. Id. at 193-200, 378 N.W.2d at 338-42. See MICH. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 5 (relat-
ing to free speech, assembly and petition); id. art. II, § 9 (relating to initiative powers).
100. Woodland, 423 Mich. at 200, 378 N.W.2d at 342.
101. Id. at 210-12, 378 N.W.2d at 347-48.
102. Id. at 224-33, 378 N.W.2d at 353-57.
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this Court, and, most importantly, the understanding with which it
was adopted by the people of this state. 103
5. New York Shad Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall'04 concerned
the alleged infringement of the free speech rights of anti-nuclear activ-
ists in a New York shopping mall. 05 The activists distributed leaflets
espousing their viewpoint and urged passersby to attend upcoming
anti-nuclear protests, all in violation of the mall's established
policies. 0 6
The New York court first rejected the suggestion that state action
was not a necessary component of constitutional litigation:
A disciplined perception of the proper role of the judiciary, and,
more specifically, discernment of the reach of the mandates of our
State Constitution, precludes us from casting aside so fundamental
a concept as state action in an effort to achieve what the dissent
perceives as a more socially desirable result. 10 7
Having upheld the state action requirement, the court then addressed
the activists' arguments that state action existed in the private shop-
ping mall.
Discussion concerning the purportedly unobstructive nature of
plaintiffs' activities, the need for inexpensive channels of communi-
cation, and the long and rich tradition of free expression in this state
begs the question. Such factors are irrelevant to whether State ac-
tion is present and whether there has been a constitutional infringe-
ment. Since there is no State action involved, the provisions of our
State Constitution have no role in the resolution of a dispute be-
tween private parties. 108
6. North Carolina. State v. Felmet '09 concerned a criminal tres-
pass conviction. The defendant sought signatures on a petition in the
parking lot of a large regional shopping mall, contrary to mall pol-
icy. 10 The North Carolina Supreme Court adopted the Lloyd analysis
of the United States Supreme Court and rejected the invitation to ex-
tend the parameters of its constitution beyond the federal bounda-
ries."' The court upheld the trespass conviction because the
103. Id at 235, 378 N.W.2d at 358.
104. 66 N.Y.2d 496, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 498 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1985).
105. Id See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8 (relating to free speech).
106. Shad Alliance, 66 N.Y.2d at 449, 488 N.E.2d at 1212-13, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
107. Id. at 505, 488 N.E.2d at 1217, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 105.
108. Id. at 506-07, 488 N.E.2d at 1218, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 106 (footnote omitted).
109. 302 N.C. 173, 273 S.E.2d 708 (1981).
110. Id. at 177-78, 273 S.E.2d at 711-12. The petitioner refused to leave the park-
ing lot at the behest of a mall security guard and was subsequently arrested by the
police for trespass. Id.
11. Id.
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defendant's ftee speech and petition rights did not apply to private
property." 12
7. Pennsylvania. In Western Pennsylvania Socialist Workers 1982
Campaign v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., 113 a political
committee sought an injunction to require the owners of a privately-
owned shopping mall to permit its representatives to solicit petition
signatures on mall property. 114 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court re-
jected the petitioners' argument that its constitution was the proper
tool for resolving disputes between private parties:
Free people regulate their private affairs through individual adjust-
ment. We should be wary of insulating that development against
legislative, judicial, or private change by enshrining a particular po-
sition in the text of the constitution. 115
The court was unswayed by arguments that the modem shopping
center had become a societal focal point:
Law and sociology are not coextensive. Though shopping malls
may fulfill some of the societal functions of the traditional main
street or town marketplace, we do not believe that this makes them
their legal equivalent. 116
The court f:und that the private shopping mall was not a state
actor."17
8. Washington. Alderwood Associates v. Washington Environmen-
tal Council "1 concerned whether environmental activists had a Wash-
ington state constitutional right to solicit signatures for initiative
petitions in a privately-owned shopping mall. 19 A four-member panel
of the Washington Supreme Court held that Washington's free speech
and initiative clauses did not require state action as a prerequisite to
112. Id. See N.C. CONST. art. I, § 14 (relating to free speech).
113. 512 Pa. 23, 515 A.2d 1331 (1986).
114. Id. at 27, 515 A.2d at 1333. See PA. CONSr. art. I, § 2 (relating to free
speech); id. art. I, § 20 (relating to free assembly and petition).
115. Socialist Workers, 512 Pa. at 31-32, 515 A.2d at 1335.
116. Id at 33, 515 A.2d at 1336.
117. Id. at 39, 515 A.2d at 1339. One troubling aspect of this decision, however, is
that the Pennsylvania court's ruling seems dependent upon the nature of the mall
owner's restrictions on political public expression. Id. at 32-36, 515 A.2d at 1336-38.
Apparently, the mall owner is only free to construct uniform barriers to free speech
and petition; favoring one political position over the other, arguably, would not be
permissible. Id Cf Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520 (1975) (content-based lim-
its upon free expression are unconstitutional).
118. 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981) (en banc). See WASH. CONsT. art. I,
§ 5 (relating to free speech); id. art. II, § 1 (relating to initiative powers).
119. Id at 232-33, 635 P.2d at 110.
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litigation.120 Although Justice Dolliver concurred in the majority's re-
sult, he sharply rejected the reasoning of the plurality, stating only
that the constitutional provisions relating to the initiative process did
not have such a barrier. 121 For this reason, only the proposition that
initiative activities are protected by the Washington Constitution com-
manded a majority of the court.
In Southcenter v. National Democratic Policy Committee, 122 a
clear majority of the Washington Supreme Court concluded that while
the protection of initiative activities did not require state action,123 free
expression in shopping malls was not similarly unencumbered. 124 The
private mall owner in Southcenter could constitutionally prevent a
political party committee from distributing literature, soliciting mem-
bers and requesting contributions. 125
9. Wisconsin. In Jacobs v. Major,126 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court considered whether the free speech provisions of its constitution
require shopping mall owners "to permit non-consensual use of their
facilities by others."'127 The case concerned dancing and leafleting by
an anti-nuclear group in two malls. Once again, the malls' policies
prohibited such activities. 12  The court rejected the group's argument
that their constitutional right to free speech placed any limitations on
the mall owners:
We do not accept the proposition that a negative restraint on gov-
ernment creates a positive right assertable against all other per-
sons.... To turn what was prohibition of governmental acts into
positive rights against other private persons is not logical nor histor-
ically established. In fact, it would be contrary to history. Courts
would be ill-advised to rewrite history and plain, clear constitu-
tional language to create some new rights contrary to history. To
do this courts would become mini-constitutional conventions in in-
dividual court cases whenever a new theory or philosophy became
appealing. To say that whenever a balancing must be done between
free speech and private interests that free speech must prevail is to
give vent to one's own choices and to rewrite history and the consti-
tution in personal terms. That is not the right nor privilege of
courts or judges.129
120. Id. at 243-44, 635 P.2d at 116.
121. Id. at 251-52, 635 P.2d at 120 (Dolliver, J., concurring).
122. 113 Wash. 2d 413, 780 P.2d 1282 (1989) (en banc).
123. Id. at .., 780 P.2d at 1290.
124. Id. at _, 780 P.2d at 1291.
125. Id. at _, 780 P.2d at 1292.
126. 139 Wis. 2d 492, 407 N.W.2d 832 (1987).
127. Id. at 495-96, 407 N.W.2d at 833. See WIs. CONST. art. I, § 30 (relating to
free speech).
128. Jacobs, 139 Wis. 2d at 497-99, 407 N.W.2d at 834.
129. Id. at 512, 407 N.W.2d at 840.
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The court concluded that the dancing protestors could not establish
that the state acted in the guise of the mall owners. The malls' preclu-
sion of political activity prevailed. 130
IV. STATE ACTION IN ALASKA
We have now explored the state of state action under the federal
constitution, as well as in those state jurisdictions that have addressed
this issue in the context of shopping center cases. As was noted in the
introduction, however, simply asserting the existence of the state ac-
tion requirement begs the question of why it is so integral a component
of our constitutional framework. This section analyzes why state ac-
tion is an important and unifonn requirement under the Alaska
Constitution.
Part A explores the traditional sources for the state action re-
quirement, emphasizing the history that attended the adoption of the
Alaska Constitution. Part B then examines the fundamental philo-
sophical source for the state action requirement: that the protection to
all persons of the natural right to "life, liberty and the pursuit of hap-
piness"'13 applies only to governmental control, and not other individ-
uals. Part C examines the state action requirement from the
perspective of the separation of powers doctrine. This doctrine re-
quires that the judiciary refrain from the resolution of conflicting
"constitutional" interests in the absence of state action. Part D then
turns to three recent decisions of Alaska appellate courts concerning
the state action requirement. Finally, Part E examines the questions
presented by the shopping center cases against the backdrop of the
Alaska Constitution and proposes some conclusions.
A. Traditional Sources for the State Action Requirement
The Alaska appellate courts have uniformly recognized the state
action requirement in constitutional litigation. State action has been
required in cases involving search and seizure, 132 due process of
130. Ia at 528, 407 N.W.2d at 847.
131. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 1.
132. Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State Dept. of Labor, 565 P.2d 138, 148 (Alaska
1977); Bell v. State, 519 P.2d 804, 807 (Alaska 1974); Weltz v. State, 431 P.2d 502,
506 (Alaska 1967).
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law, 133 the right to privacy, 34 the right of free expression, 135 equal
protection,136 and civil rights.137
In general terms, the Alaska Supreme Court has taken a tradi-
tional approach to the state action requirement in constitutional litiga-
tion: "The American constitutional theory is that constitutions are a
restraining force against the abuse of governmental power, not that in-
dividual rights are a matter of governmental sufferance."' 138 As the
court noted in Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Brown :139
It is hombook law that most of the rights secured by the constitu-
tion are protected only against governmental infringement. Private
parties may sometimes be subjected to suit because they have
usurped or assumed functions traditionally exercised only by the
government, or because their actions were taken in collaboration
with action by the state. 14
Finally, the court has recently stated:
Once a fundamental right under the constitution of Alaska has been
shown to be involved and it has been further shown that this consti-
tutionally protected right has been impaired by governmental action,
then the government must come forward and meet its substantial
burden of establishing that the abridgment in question was justified
by a compelling governmental interest.' 4 '
The documentary history of the Alaska Constitutional Conven-
tion supports these conclusions. In November 1955, the Alaska State-
hood Committee submitted a series of three documents entitled
Constitutional Studies to the delegates to the Alaska Constitution Con-
vention. 42 These documents were prepared by the Public Adminis-
tration Service, a nonprofit organization devoted to providing research
133. Ostrow v. Higgins, 722 P.2d 936, 942 (Alaska 1986); Estate of Miner v. Com-
mercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n, 635 P.2d 827, 829 (Alaska 1981); Nichols v. Eckert,
504 P.2d 1359, 1362 (Alaska 1973).
134. Leudtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1130 (Alaska 1989);
Messerli v. State, 626 P.2d 81, 84 (Alaska 1981); Woods & Rohde, Inc. v. State Dept.
of Labor, 565 P.2d 138, 148 (Alaska 1977); Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 416 (Alaska
1976).
135. Johnson v. Tait, 774 P.2d 185, 190 (Alaska 1989); Messerli v. State, 626 P.2d
81, 84 (Alaska 1981); Fardig v. Municipality of Anchorage, 785 P.2d 911, 914-15
(Alaska Ct. App. 1990).
136. Alaska Pac. Assurance Co. v. Brown, 687 P.2d 264, 275 (Alaska 1984).
137. U.S. Jaycees v. Richardet, 666 P.2d 1008, 1013 (Alaska 1983).
138. Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 394 (Alaska 1970) (emphasis
added).
139. 687 P.2d 264 (Alaska 1984).
140. Id at 275 (citations omitted).
141. Jones v. Jennings, 788 P.2d 732, 739 n.16 (Alaska 1990) (emphasis added)
(quoting Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 171 (Alaska 1972)).
142. PUBLIC ADMIN. SERV., ALASKA STATEHOOD COMM. FOR THE ALASKA
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES (1955 & photo. reprint
1969).
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and consulting services for governmental jurisdictions and agencies, at
the behest of the Alaska Statehood Committee and pursuant to an act
of the Alaska Territorial Legislature. 143 Constitutional Studies was
submitted to the Alaska Constitutional Convention delegates to assist
them in drafting Alaska's constitution. 144
Volume two of Constitutional Studies concerned "civil rights and
liberties," and explicitly set forth the basis for the state action
requirement:
Traditionally it is government and not the individual citizen
which is limited by the Bills of Rights [sic] of the national and state
constitutions. The protections afforded by the constitutions are pro-
tections against encroachment by government on spheres of citizen
activity which are constitutionally declared to be "civil rights and
liberties" and therefore beyond the purview of government.
Traditionally, too, bills of rights are negative and restrictive in
character rather than positive. The citizens are not compelled to
take certain courses of action by the Bills of Rights [sic] of constitu-
tions. Obligations may be enjoined on the citizenry by the pressure
of public opinion or even by legislative enactment, but seldom, if
ever, is there a constitutional compulsion. 145
At the time of Alaska's constitutional convention, the framers
had before -them a clear statement of the state action requirement in
constitutional litigation and its philosophical underpinnings. 146 The
Alaska Supreme Court has consistently followed that approach.
B. Individual Liberty as a Source for the State Action
Requirement
The initial philosophical significance of the state action require-
ment is that it affords individual citizens a wide sphere of liberty.
Constitutions traditionally guard against the erosion or impairment of
individual liberty by placing restrictions on government power. Other
areas of human affairs are thus left to individual choice: "The
143. Id. See Act approved Mar. 25, 1949, ch. 108, § 3(a), 1949 Alaska Sess. Laws
269 (authorizing the Alaska Statehood Committee to "[h]ave ready, in preparation for
the Constitutional Convention, fully detailed information and analyses for use by the
Convention in preparing the required draft of a constitution for Alaska, to the end
that the people may have the opportunity of passing upon an entirely sound and thor-
oughly prepared document.").
144. Id.
145. PUBLIC ADMIN. SERV., ALASKA STATEHOOD COMM. FOR THE ALASKA
CONSTrrUTIONAL CONVENTION, Civil Rights and Liberties, in I CONSTITUTIONAL
STUDiES 3 (1955 & photo. reprint 1969) (emphasis in original).
146. V. FISCHER, ALASKA'S CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 69 (1975) ("State-
hood proponents saw the Constitution as a means to define the powers that would be
accrued to the people as well as the limits that would be placed on the powers of
government.").
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enumeration of rights in this constitution shall not impair or deny
others retained by the people." 147
Why does the Alaska Constitution protect only against govern-
ment action, as opposed to the actions of individuals? The fundamen-
tal source of this conclusion lies in the philosophy of individual rights
embodied in article I, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution, which
states: "This constitution is dedicated to the principle that all persons
have a natural right to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the
enjoyment of the rewards of their own industry .... ,"148 The Alaska
Supreme Court has not yet defined the full parameters of this section,
but it has concluded that the notion of total immunity from govern-
mental control forms the core of the concept of liberty:149 "No right is
held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded. .. than the right of
every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free
from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unques-
tionable authority of law."' 50 The inherent rights described in article
I, section 1 are thus "natural" shields that individuals possess as pro-
tection from their government.' 5'
The "whole significance of constitutional government"'1 2 is that
it not only locates sovereign power in individuals designated or chosen
in some prescribed manner, but also defines "the limit of its exercise so
as to protect individual rights, and shield them against the assumption
of arbitrary power."' 5 3 It thus follows that the fundamental nature of
147. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 21.
148. Id art. I, § 1.
149. Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 168 (Alaska 1972). As the Alaska Supreme
Court recognized in Leudtke, traditional constitutional analysis demonstrates that
constitutions serve as a check on the power of government. "'That all lawful power
derives from the people and must be held in check to preserve their freedom is the
oldest and most central tenet of American constitutionalism."' Leudtke v. Nabors
Alaska Drilling, 768 P.2d 1123, 1129 (Alaska 1989) (quoting L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTrTIONAL LAw 2 (2d ed. 1988)).
150. Breese, 501 P.2d at 168 (quoting Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250,
251 (1891)).
151. In expressing a philosophy of "natural rights" as the source of individual lib-
erty, the framers of the Alaska Constitution joined in a tradition reaching as far back
as Socrates. For the development of the history of the idea of "natural rights," see L.
STRAuSs, NATURAL RIGHT AND I-ISTORY (1971).
For a contemporary analysis of the role of "natural rights" philosophy and its
effect upon the framers of the federal constitution, see R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRI-
VATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAI 8-18 (1985) (discussing
Lockean conception of "natural right" as source of federal constitutional framers' in-
tent). See also Jaffa, What Were The "Original Intentions" Of The Framers Of The
Constitution Of The United States?, 10 PUGET SOUND L. REv. 351 (1987) (philosophi-
cal treatment of original intent arguments).
152. Southcenter v. National Democratic Policy Comm., 113 Wash. 2d 413, 422,
780 P.2d 1282, 1286 (1989) (en bane).
153. Id. (quoting 1 T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 5 (8th ed. 1927)).
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a constitution is to govern the relationship between the people and
their government, "not to control the rights of the people vis-a-vis
each other."154 In examining the state action requirement of its con-
stitution, the Michigan Supreme Court framed this point as follows:
A fundamental philosophical tenet underlying our constitutional
system is that the preservation of the personal freedom of the indi-
vidual is an important function of our federal and state governments
and one of the primary reasons for limiting their activity....
It is at the heart of the American libertarian tradition that the
individual be given wide rein in structuring his relationships
with other individuals, if only because the alternative of close
governmental control threatens liberty itself.155
The philosophy of individual liberty described and protected by the
Alaska Constitution, combined with the retention of certain political
power with the people, requires that private choices and private con-
duct be exempt from the reach of constitutional prohibitions. Main-
taining the proper scope of constitutional protections "stops the
Constitution short of preempting individual liberty - of denying to
individuals the freedom [which] would be lost if individuals had to
conform their conduct to the Constitution's demands."1 56
C. Separation of Powers Doctrine as a Source for the State Action
Requirement
In The Federalist No. 78, Alexander Hamilton argued:
Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power
must perceive that, in a government in which they are separated
from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will
always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitu-
tion .... The executive not only dispenses the honors but holds the
sword of the community. The legislature not only commands the
purse but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every
citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no
154. Id. The Wisconsin Supreme Court makes this point even more boldly: "Gov-
ernments were not to be trusted, but rather were controlled by Declarations of Rights
from any interference with those rights. This does not mean that these rights needed
protection from interference by other persons. To turn what was prohibition of gov-
ernmental acts into positive rights against other persons is not logical nor historically
established." Jacobs v. Major, 139 Wis. 2d 492, 512, 407 N.W.2d 832, 840 (1987).
155. Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 423 Mich. 188, 211, 378 N.W.2d 337,
347 (1985) (quoting Burke and Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Credi-
tors'Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 1003, 1016
(1973)). Accord, Jacobs, 139 Wis. 2d at 506, 407 N.W.2d at 837 ("State constitution
Bills of Rights set the limit beyond which 'no human legislation should be suffered to
conflict with the rights declared to be inherent and inalienable'") (emphasis in origi-
nal) (quoting W. BATEMAN, POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTiONAL LAW 14 n.1 (1876)).
156. Southcenter v. National Democratic Policy Comm., 113 Wash. 2d 413, 430,
780 P.2d 1282, 1290-91 (1989) (en bane) (quoting L. TaxBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrU-
TIONAL LAW 1691 (2d ed. 1988)).
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influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of
the strength or of the wealth of the society, and can take no active
resolution whatsoever. It may truly be said to have neither FORCE
nor WILL but merely judgment .... 157
This is the classic formulation of the separation of powers doctrine, a
doctrine which plays a "conceptually central role in the structure of
American constitutional government."1 58
Articles II, III and IV of the Alaska Constitution define the pow-
ers of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government
respectively.'5 9 These articles decree a separation of powers among
the branches of Alaska's government that prohibits the judiciary from
"creating" rather than "interpreting" the law.' 6° The framers of the
Alaska Constitution followed the traditional federal framework, which
incorporated the separation of powers doctrine.16'
The separation of powers doctrine is relevant to the state action
requirement because, in the absence of state action, the judicial branch
of government necessarily must formulate rules to resolve "constitu-
tional" disputes between private parties. 162 In the shopping center
157. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (em-
phasis in original in part and emphasis added in part). See also Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824) ("Courts are the mere instruments
of the law and can will nothing. When they are said to exercise a discretion, it is a
mere legal discretion, a discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed
by law. .. ").
158. Bradner v. Hammond, 553 P.2d 1, 5 (Alaska 1976). See also State Motorcy-
cle Dealers Assoc. v. State, 111 Wash. 2d 667, 675, 763 P.2d 442, 446 (1988) ("Ameri-
can courts are constantly wary not to trench upon the prerogatives of other
departments of government or to arrogate to themselves any undue powers, lest they
disturb the balance of power; and this principle has contributed greatly to the success
of the American system of government and to the strength of the judiciary itself.")
(quoting 16 AM. JuR. 2D Constitutional Law § 309 (1979)).
159. See ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 1 ("The legislative power of the State is vested
in... a legislature .... "); id art. I1, § 1 ("The executive power of the State is vested
in the governor."); ia art. IV, § 1 ("The judicial power of the State is vested in a
supreme court, a superior court, and the courts established by the legislature.").
160. State v. Campbell, 536 P.2d 105, 111 (Alaska 1975), overruled on other
grounds, Kimoktoak v. State, 584 P.2d 25, 31 (Alaska 1978).
161. Bradner, 553 P.2d at 5.
162. In a rather acidic concurrence, Justice Dolliver, in Alderwood Assoc. v.
Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981), described the role
of the judiciary in the absence of a state action requirement:
The majority opinion represents a determination by the court that it, instead
of the legislature, will settle conflicting interests among citizens and that it
will accomplish this by what it chooses to call a constitutional basis. This is
in marked contrast to what had formerly been the responsibility of the court:
the legislature would allocate interests among competing groups and individ-
uals and the court would then decide, if an action were brought, whether in
this legislative allocation a constitutional right of a citizen against the state
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cases, for instance, the court must balance two conflicting, private in-
terests: those of the would-be constitutional plaintiff against those of
the shopping center owner. 163
As the Washington Supreme Court has recently noted, however,
the resolution of such private conflicting interests is properly the func-
tion of the legislative branch of government, not the courts:
Were we to assume the role of weighing competing constitutional
interests asserted between private parties ... we would be violating
the separation of powers principles... by arrogating to the judicial
branch of government powers that properly reside with the legisla-
tive branch of government. As the Supreme Court of Connecticut
aptly observed in the face of a like invitation in a similar case:
It is not the role of this court to strike precise balances among
the fluctuating interests of competing private groups which
then become rigidified in the granite of constitutional adjudica-
tion. That function has traditionally been performed by the
legislature, which has far greater competence and flexibility to
deal with the myriad complications which may arise from the
exercise of constitutional rights by some in diminution of those
of others .... Statutes would become largely obsolete if courts in
evey instance of the assertion of conflicting constitutional rights
should presume to carve out in the immutable form of constitu-
tional adjudication the precise configuration needed to reconcile
the conflict 16
The Alaska Supreme Court has never relied on the separation of
powers doctrine as a basis for the state action requirement. Given the
"brooding omnipresence" 165 of separation of powers doctrine in
Alaska constitutional jurisprudence, however, its relevance to the state
action issue cannot be overstated. Without state action, there is "no
limit to the range of wrongs which [a] court may right - subject only
to the court's notion of balancing interests."1 66 If conflicting interests
had been violated. Now the court will be able to dispense with the inconven-
ience and cumbersomeness of legislative activity.
Id at 250, 635 P.2d at 119 (Dolliver, J., concurring).
163. Indeed, there is literally no way for the court, in the absence of a state action
requirement, to keep from resolving constitutional disputes. Property rights, such as
those of the shopping center owner, are fundamental to liberty itself. "Sometimes
courts have not been as sensitive to the protection of property rights as they have been
in defense of personal liberty. Personal liberty means very little when one's property
rights are invaded ..... " State v. Norene, 457 P.2d 926, 931 (Alaska 1969).
164. Southcenter v. National Democratic Policy Comm., 113 Wash. 2d 413, 426,
780 P.2d 1282, 1288-89 (1989) (en bane) (emphasis in original) (quoting Cologne v.
Westfarms Assoc., 192 Conn. 48, 65, 469 A.2d 1201, 1210 (1984)).
165. Bradner, 553 P.2d at 5.
166. Alderwood Assoc. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 250, 635
P.2d 108, 119 (1981) (Dolliver, J., concurring).
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are to be allocated among competing groups, it is the legislature's re-
sponsibility to perform that allocation. 167
D. Recent Decisions Involving State Action Under Alaska Law
1. The Crazy Horse Case. Anthony Tait was a member of the
Hell's Angels Motorcycle Club. 168 One evening Tait went into the
Crazy Horse bar in Anchorage wearing his motorcycle jacket which
had affixed to it the "colors" of his motorcycle club. 169 The Crazy
Horse had a policy prohibiting the members of motorcycle clubs from
wearing "colors" on its premises. 170 Tait was informed by a Crazy
Horse door attendant that he would have to remove his jacket or leave
the bar. Tait chose to leave and subsequently instituted a civil action
against the owner of the Crazy Horse. 171
Tait alleged that the "no-colors" policy at the Crazy Horse vio-
lated his right to free expression under article I, section 5 of the
Alaska Constitution.1 72 Agreeing with Tait's arguments, the superior
court permanently enjoined the Crazy Horse from prohibiting the dis-
play of motorcycle club "colors" in its tavern.173
On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court characterized the issue
before it as "whether [article I, section 5 of the Alaska Constitution]
protects the right of free expression against infringement by the owner
of private property."' 174 The court analyzed the line of federal cases
from Marsh through Hudgens,175 as well as analogous cases from
other states, 176 and concluded:
We are aware of no case requiring the individual proprietor of
a small establishment to provide a forum for the expressive rights of
her fellow citizens. To the contrary, several of the cases on which
Tait relies emphasize that the property was not a "modest retail
167. It is beyond the scope of this article to assess the pros and cons of such action
by the legislature. The discussion in notes 147 through 156, supra, states compelling
reasons for the legislature not to promulgate such "positive" statutory rights. As one
commentator has written, "Legitimate government arises solely from a voluntary
agreement embodied in laws binding rules and rules by which it is understood that all
government exists to secure equally the natural rights of every citizen and happiness of
all." Jaffa, supra note 151, at 416.
168. Johnson v. Tait, 774 P.2d 185, 186 (Alaska 1989).
169. Id The colors were displayed in the form of a custom leather patch which
identified Tait as a member of the Alaska Chapter of the Hell's Angels. Id. at n.1.
170. d at 186.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 186. See ALAsKA CONST. art. I, § 5 ("Every person may freely speak,
write, and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.").
173. Tait, 774 P.2d at 186.
174. Id. at 186-87.
175. Id. at 187-88. See supra notes 12 through 55 and accompanying text.
176. Tait, 774 P.2d at 188-90. See supra notes 60 through 130 and accompanying
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establishment." We do not believe that the framers intended article
I, section 5 to extend a doctrine which began in the streets of a com-
pany town inside the doors of a privately owned tavern.
We hold that article I, section 5 of the Alaska Constitution
does not apply to the proprietor of a small establishment such as the
Crazy Horse. Absent such a constitutional limitation, the proprie-
tor of a small establishment such as the Crazy Horse may validly
refuse to serve anyone for any reason not prohibited by statute. As
a matter of law, the rationale in the shopping center and university
cases does not overcome the private autonomy of a small proprietor in
the conduct of its business. Given our conclusion, we leave to a more
appropriate case our resolution of the question presented in the shop-
ping center cases.177
The Crazy Horse case seemed to turn on the relatively small na-
ture of the business at issue. The court specifically left open the ques-
tion of whether large retail shopping centers performed a sufficiently
"public function" to invoke Alaska constitutional safeguards.17,
2. The Fardig Case. The Alaska Court of Appeals recently ad-
dressed state action in a criminal trespass case. In Fardig v. Munici-
pality of Anchorage, 179 several pro-life protestors were distributing
literature in the parking lot of the Alaska Women's Health Services'
building. They were arrested and charged with trespass after refusing
to leave the premises.180 Fardig and her codefendants unsuccessfully
asserted as a defense, inter alia, that the charges of trespass unconsti-
tutionally interfered with their freedom of speech.18'
On appeal, the Alaska Court of Appeals referred to the line of
federal cases emanating from Marsh and numerous analogous state
cases.182 Relying upon the Alaska Supreme Court's analysis in Crazy
Horse, the court concluded that the office building at issue in Fardig
was not of the size or nature necessary to impose constitutional limita-
tions upon its owners.' 83 Accordingly, the court rejected the defend-
ants' free expression defense to their trespass convictions.' 8 4
177. Tait, 774 P.2d at 190 (citation and footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
178. Id.
179. 785 P.2d 911 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990).
180. Id.
181. Id at 913. See ALASKA CONsT. art. I, § 5, supra note 172.
182. Fardig, 785 P.2d at 915. See supra notes 12 through 55 and notes 60 through
130 and accompanying text.
183. Fardig, 785 P.2d at 915.
184. Id
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3. The Leudtke Anomaly. The state action doctrine in Alaska
took an anomalous turn in the case of Leudtke v. Nabors Alaska Drill-
ing, Ina 18 5 On its face, Leudtke seems to uphold the state action re-
quirement, which has been prevalent in Alaska jurisprudence since
statehood.186 However, the Alaska Supreme Court's desire to reach
an equitable result for the individual plaintiffs, the Leudtkes, may have
opened a procedural door -just a crack - for private litigants to use
constitutional swords absent state action.
Leudtke concerned the termination of two former employees of
Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., Clarence and Paul Leudtke, who
worked on oil drilling rigs on the North Slope of Alaska. Both refused
to submit to a urinalysis screening to detect drug use as required by
Nabors. When they failed to submit to these drug tests, the Leudtkes
were fired.18 7
The Leudtkes alleged, inter alia, that Nabors' drug testing pro-
gram violated their right to privacy under article I, section 22 of the
Alaska Constitution and breached the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing implicit in their employment contracts with Nabors.""' The
trial court rejected these and other claims asserted by the Leudtkes
and an appeal ensued.189
The Alaska Supreme Court first considered whether the right to
privacy embodied in the Alaska Constitution could be used by the
Leudtkes as a basis for refusing drug testing by a private employer. 190
The court recognized that certain constitutional provisions, at least on
a federal level, proscribed private conduct.1 91 However, the Alaska
Supreme Court was unconvinced that "Alaska's constitutional right to
privacy was intended to operate as a bar to private action, here
Nabors' drug testing program." 192 The court concluded:
Absent a history demonstrating that the amendment was intended
to proscribe private action, or a proscription of private action in the
language of the amendment itself, we decline to extend the constitu-
tional right to privacy to the actions of private parties. 19 3
185. 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989).
186. See supra notes 132 through 146 and accompanying text.
187. Leudtke, 768 P.2d at 1124-25.
188. Id. See ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 ("The right of the people to privacy is
recognized and shall not be infringed. The legislature shall implement this section.").
189. Leudtke, 768 P.2d at 1126-27.
190. Ia at 1129-30.
191. Ia ("We are aware, however, of constitutional clauses which prohibit private
action. The Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, prohibiting
slavery, applies to private action.") The Alaska court also noted constitutional provi-
sions from other states which had been construed to apply to private action. Id. at
1130.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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The court thus reached the traditional conclusion on the state action
question.
The anomaly of Leudtke, however, lies in the portion of the opin-
ion concerning Nabors' alleged breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. 194 In Mitford v. De LaSala,195 the Alaska Supreme
Court recognized that all employment contracts in Alaska contained
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 196 The court later
concluded that a violation of public policy could give rise to a breach
of that covenant. 197 Based upon these prior cases, the court in Leudtke
concluded that "there is a public policy supporting the protection of
employee privacy [and a] [v]iolation of that policy by an employer
may rise to the level of a breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing."' 198
The troubling issue in Leudtke is the source of the public policy
favoring employee privacy. The court noted that public policy is a
very general term and difficult to define. 199 However, it went on to
conclude that it would "look to the entire body of law in the State of
Alaska for evidence of citizens rights, duties and responsibilities, to
determine the public policy with regard to employee privacy. ' '2°0
The court found support for employee privacy rights from three
sources. 201 First, certain legislative limitations on employer inquiries
of its employees, such as prohibitions on polygraph tests20 2 and an-
tidiscrimination provisions, 20 3 provide evidence of a general legislative
intent to "liberally protect employee rights. '204 The difficulty with
this analysis is that if the legislature had chosen to place limitations on
drug testing by private employers, it could have done so. In the ab-
sence of such legislation, the Alaska court has extrapolated from legis-
lation, in essence, to enact its own.
Second, and most troubling, the court relies upon the Alaska
Constitution's privacy clause.20 5 After having decisively rejected the
right to privacy as a basis for independent action owing to the absence
194. See id. at 1130-33.
195. 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983).
196. Id. at 1007.
197. Knight v. American Guard & Alert, Inc., 714 P.2d 788, 792 (Alaska 1986).
198. Leudtke, 768 P.2d at 1130.
199. Id. at 1132 ("There is no precise definition of the term [public policy].")
(quoting Palmateer v. International Harvester, 85 Ill. 2d 124, 130, 421 N.E.2d 876,
878 (1981)).
200. Id. (citation omitted).
201. Id. at 1132-33.
202. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.037 (Supp. 1989).
203. Id. § 13.80.200(a).
204. Leudtke, 768 P.2d at 1132.
205. Id at 1132-33. See ALAsKA CoNsT. art. I, § 22, supra note 188.
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of state action, the court then used this very standard against the pri-
vate employer in the context of a public policy breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing:2°6 "Certainly the fact that the citizenry
has incorporated the right to privacy in the Alaska Constitution
strongly supports the contention that this right 'strike[s] at the heart
of a citizen's social rights.' "207 The use of constitutional rights in this
context raises the ominous question of how far the public policy
breach may intrude into the state action doctrine. Will private em-
ployers now be subject to search and seizure limitations,20 8 due pro-
cess of law requirements, 2°9 religious freedom restrictions, 210 or any
other of the panoply of constitutional rights and limitations in the
Alaska Constitution? Furthermore, because the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is inherent not just to employment contracts but
to many other contracts as well, 211 what prevents this imposition of
constitutional rights and limitations upon parties to other types of
contracts?
Finally, the court also identified a public policy interest in privacy
based upon the common law right to privacy.2 12 Of course, since the
common law is a judicial creation, using the common law as a source
for "public policy" is a rather circular endeavor. Nevertheless, based
on these "public policy" sources, the court concluded:
Thus, the citizens' right to be protected against unwarranted
intrusions into their private lives has been recognized in the law of
Alaska. The Constitution protects against governmental intrusion,
statutes protect against employer intrusion, and the common law
protects against intrusions by other private persons. As a result,
there is sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that there ex-
ists a public policy protecting spheres of employee conduct into
which employers may not intrude.213
Having found a public policy in favor of employee privacy, the
court was left to evaluate whether Nabors' drug testing policy violated
that right.214 After balancing the Leudtkes' privacy rights against the
countervailing public policy supporting the health and safety of other
workers and even the Leudtkes themselves, the court concluded that
206. Leudtke 768 P.2d at 1132.
207. Id. at 1133 (quoting Palmateer v. International Harvester, 85 Ill. 2d 124, 130,
421 N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (1981)).
208. See ALASKA CONsT. art. I, § 14.
209. See id. § 7.
210. See id. § 4.
211. See, ag., ALASKA STAT. § 45.01.203 (1986) (the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in the context of the Uniform Commercial Code).
212. Leudtke 768 P.2d at 1133.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1136.
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Nabors was justified in conducting drug testing.215 However, the
court noted that Nabors' drug testing program must meet two require-
ments: "First, the drug test must be conducted at a time reasonably
contemporaneous with the employee's work time.... Second, an em-
ployee must receive notice of the adoption of a drug testing pro-
gram., 216 The Leudtke court not only created a public policy breach
of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing based upon unrelated
legislative enactments, inapplicable constitutional provisions, and
prior judicial pronouncements, but it also went on to set the standards
for permissible drug testing by private employers.
Leudtke demonstrates the important role of the state action re-
quirement in constitutional litigation. When the court imposes consti-
tutional limitations upon private litigants, in this case through the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the court chooses to
act where the legislature should.217
E. Proposed Resolution of the State Action Question Presented by
Shopping Centers Under the Alaska Constitution
As noted earlier, Crazy Horse expressly left open the question of
whether state action is required by the Alaska Constitution in the con-
text of large shopping centers.218 The first question presented by the
shopping center case is whether Alaska's constitutional framers in-
tended that private property owners be treated any differently than
other citizens. In Crazy Horse, the Alaska Supreme Court recognized
that the framers did not intend "article I, section 5 to extend a doc-
trine which began in the streets of a company town inside the doors of
a privately owned tavern." 219 The historical documents that influ-
enced the adoption of the Alaska Constitution demonstrate that our
framers intended a consistent restriction on the power of govern-
ment.220 The framers did not distinguish among the owners of private
property for the purposes of requiring state action. It is thus fair to
conclude that they envisioned nothing less than the uniform applica-
tion of the state action requirement in constitutional litigation.
The second question presented by the shopping center case is
whether the owner of such a center is at liberty to make choices that
conflict with constitutional norms and, thereby, affect other people.
There is no reason to believe that the owners of shopping centers are
215. Id.
216. d at 1136-37.
217. For the discussion regarding the separation of powers doctrine, see supra
notes 157 through 167 and accompanying text.
218. Johnson v. Tait, 774 P.2d at 185, 190 (Alaska 1989).
219. Id
220. See supra notes 142 through 146 and accompanying text.
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any less protected by article I, section 1 of the Alaska Constitution
than those who own taverns:
Property does not have rights. People have rights. The right to
enjoy property without unlawful deprivation, no less than the right
to speak or the right to travel, is in truth a "personal" right ....
[A] fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to
liberty and the personal right in property. Neither could have mean-
ing without the other.221
Property rights, such as those of shopping center owners, are thus
fundamental to liberty itself. "Personal liberty means very little when
one's property rights are invaded ... .-"222 As such, the philosophy of
individual rights embodied in the Alaska Constitution must extend to
the owners of shopping centers.
The third question presented by the shopping center case is
whether the separation of powers doctrine demands state action as
well. The shopping center owner and the would-be constitutional
plaintiff are, in principle, on the same playing field as the parties in
Crazy Horse. In both instances, the absence of a state action require-
ment requires the judiciary to balance conflicting sets of interests, a
task not properly within the domain of the courts. 223 The separation
of powers doctrine therefore mandates that state action be present in
the shopping center context.
Each of these conclusions independently supports the require-
ment of state action in "constitutional litigation" involving shopping
centers in Alaska. There are some, however, who might argue that the
sheer size of modern shopping centers justifies a result different from
that reached by the court in Crazy Horse. This argument is without
merit. The intentions, the wording and the structure of government
provided by the Alaska Constitution cannot accommodate such an ex-
ception. Indeed, in the modem age, such an argument has no bounds:
"[I]f ... size were the relevant criteria, it could well be asked how
shopping centers could be legally distinguished from places such as
sports stadiums, convention halls, theaters, county and state fairs,
large office and apartment buildings, supermarkets, department stores
or churches." 224
If Alaska citizens can be convinced that shopping center owners
should be forced to conform their conduct to constitutional norms, a
means is available for them to do so.225
221. Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972) (emphasis added).
222. State v. Norene, 457 P.2d 926, 931 (Alaska 1969).
223. See supra notes 157 through 167 and accompanying text.
224. Southcenter v. National Democratic Policy Comm., 113 Wash. 2d 413, 433,
780 P.2d 1282, 1292 (1989) (en banc).
225. ALAsKA CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (relating to constitutional amendments).
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V. CONCLUSION
Although Alaska courts have consistently required state action as
a condition to alleging constitutional claims, these courts have only
cursorily examined the foundations of this necessity. State action is
necessary because those who drafted the Alaska Constitution intended
that it be so. Furthermore, the Alaska Constitution requires state ac-
tion in order to protect the inherent liberty of Alaska citizens to make
choices that do not necessarily conform to constitutional norms. Fi-
nally, state action is necessitated by the separation of powers doctrine,
so integral to the structure of government set forth by the Alaska
Constitution.
The pervasive role modem shopping centers play in our everyday
lives suggests to some that constitutional liberties should be extended
to these seemingly public places. Freedom of expression is so critical
to our constitutional form of government that any abridgement of it
tends to shock the conscience. Our conscience, however, is not the
law.
In law, the moment of temptation is the moment of choice, when a
judge realizes that in the case before him his strongly held view of
justice, his political and moral imperative, is not embodied in a stat-
ute or any provision of the Constitution. He must then choose be-
tween his version of justice and abiding by the American form of
government. Yet the desire to do justice, whose nature seems to
him obvious, is compelling, while the concept of constitutional pro-
cess is abstract, rather arid, in the abstinence it counsels unsatisfy-
ing. To give in to temptation, just one time, solves an urgent human
problem, and a faint crack appears in the American foundation. 226
The moment of temptation for the Alaska Supreme Court
approaches.2 :2 7
226. R. BoRiu, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 1 (1990).
227. The Alaska Supreme Court may have the opportunity to resolve the issue in
Lincoln v. Northway Assoc., No. 3AN-89-9331 (Alaska Super. Ct. 1989), a case in
which the plaintiff has sued the owners of a large Anchorage shopping mall, alleging
the violation of his rights to free expression. According to his complaint, mall repre-
sentatives refused to permit the plaintiff to display a small sign protesting an
Anchorage visit by representatives of the Soviet Union. The sign - approximately 8-
I/2 inches by 6 inches - stated in Russian and in English that the "Murderer Russkis"
should "Go Home." The case is currently pending in the Alaska Superior Court,
Third Judicial District, in Anchorage.
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